Recent Pension Reforms in the EU10+1
Over the last decade, pension reform has been a major issue on the political agenda across Europe. All European countries are profoundly affected by aging populations resulting from lower fertility and increased life expectancy. In order to make pension systems more sustainable in light of prospective demographic developments, and in some cases to address current financing problems, EU10+1 countries have been reforming their pension systems since the mid-1990s. The reforms have combined measures to delay retirement, link benefits more closely to contributions, and diversify risk.
While all EU10+1 countries have made changes to their public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, some have gone further by diverting some of the pension contributions to fullyfunded, privately-managed pension savings. In most countries, switching to the new mixed system has been mandatory for younger workers and new entrants to the labor market. All countries have also introduced voluntary, supplementary pension schemes.
PAYG reforms have included increases in retirement ages (including bringing the retirement age for women more in line with that of men), reducing possibilities and incentives for early retirement, scaling back privileges for special groups, revising benefit accrual formulas, changing indexation mechanisms, and increasing contribution periods or rates. Two countries (Latvia and Poland) have fundamentally reformed their PAYG systems through the introduction of individual Notionally Defined Contribution accounts that link benefits
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Overview of Current
Pension Systems directly to contributions and spread retirement benefits over the remaining life expectancy at the time of retirement. 1 Still, current retirement ages in all EU10+1 countries remain lower for women than for men and in some cases are dependent on the number of children raised, varying from about 54 years in Slovakia and Slovenia to 60 years in Poland (Table 1) . For men, retirement ages vary from 58 in Slovenia to 65 in Poland. While no further changes are planned in Poland, all other EU10+1 countries have approved gradual increases in retirement ages for women and in some cases for men too: retirement ages for both women and men will generally increase to 62-65 years. Several countries have early retirement schemes allowing for retirement two or three years before the statutory age (in Latvia and Croatia, as much as five years). Some countries (such as Lithuania in 1995 and the Czech Republic in 1990-92 and 1995) have eliminated early retirement privileges for certain professional and social groups, while these remain in other countries (including Poland, Croatia, and Romania).
Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia and most recently Slovakia have introduced a second pension pillar through the diversion of part of the pension contributions to fully funded, privately managed pension plans ( Table 2 ). The new, mixed systems are mandatory for at least all younger workers or new entrants to the labor market in all countries except Lithuania where participation is voluntary, even for new entrants. 2 The introduction of such mixed systems has been motivated mainly by risk diversification (spreading of wage bill and political risk to include financial market risk), but also the provision of greater incentives to contribute through a closer link between contributions and benefits, increased individual choice, capital market development, and expected higher rates of return. It is also sometimes hoped that the inflow of pension funds' portfolio invested in private equities will boost aggregate investment rates, and improves prospects for economic growth rate in the future.
At the same time, the switch from pure PAYG to mixed systems involves greater individual risks (investment risk), potentially higher transaction costs (fees to fund managers), and transition costs to the PAYG systems as part of contributions are diverted to private savings and partially invested in non-governmental financial instruments 3 while current pensioners must still be fully financed from the PAYG system.
The countries which have adopted mixed systems have sought to limit these transition costs through making the switch mandatory only for younger people and phasing in gradually higher contribution rates to the funded pillar. For example, Hungary began the funded pillar with a 6 percent contribution rate compared to the current 8 percent. Given the concern in the EU10+1 countries for maintaining fiscal discipline, none of the countries opted for an immediate or complete shift to the second pillar such as Mexico or Kazakhstan did.
Current PAYG Systems
Despite the reform efforts which have been undertaken, PAYG pension expenditures (as a share of GDP) have remained high and fairly constant until now (Figure 1 ). In 2004, Poland's expen-1. Such a system was initially developed by Sweden, but has been followed by some other countries in Europe (for example, Italy). 2. In Hungary, where participation in the new system was mandatory for everyone, retirees who joined the new system less than 10 years before retiring and whose benefits from the second pillar are less than 25 percent of the PAYG benefits have recently been granted the option of moving back to the previous stand-alone PAYG system until 2012. 3 . See more in Table 12 .
Sustainability of Pension Systems in the New EU Member States and Croatia 3 diture on pensions amounted to 13 percent of GDP, among the highest in the EU. Conversely, the Baltic countries and Slovakia allocated the lowest portion of GDP to pensions (less than 7 percent of GDP). Around the world, social spending tends to rise with per capita income. While many of the EU10+1 countries are clustered toward the bottom of the distribution, they spend relatively large sums on their pension systems given their income levels. Slovenia spends as much as the United Kingdom as a share of GDP, but has an income level less than 65 percent that of this country. In a similar vein, Lithuania and Slovakia spend twice as much as Ireland on pensions while their per capita GDP levels are less than 40 percent of Ireland's. 1993-1995, 2003 1993, 1999-2002 1998 1995, 1998, 2000 1995, 2003-2004 Expenditure on old-age pensions topped the list of pension expenditure in all EU countries, but none of the EU10+1 countries were among the highest spenders in this area in Europe (Figure 2 ). However, several EU10+1 countries have high levels of disability spending relative to old age spending, most notably Poland, Croatia but also Hungary and the Czech Republic. Also, countries such as Slovenia, Poland and the Czech Republic spend relatively large amounts on early retirement. Taking all forms of retirement into account, Poland spends more relative to GDP than the EU-15 average and Croatia is not far behind.
The gap between high-and low-spending countries results largely from factors other than differences in the age structure of the population. First, the EU10+1 countries generally still have low effective retirement ages. This is partly because of incentives to retire early and partly because of past labor market policies that intentionally allowed older workers to retire early in response to rising unemployment. Recently, however, employment of older workers (aged 55-64), especially women aged 55-59, has been increasing reflecting the extension of retirement ages and the payment of full pensions to working pensioners in some countries (for example, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic; see Figure 3 ). Second, high pension spending arises because benefit levels, as measured by the replacement rate (the ratio of a person's pension to his or her income when working), tend to be generous. Third, the role of public pension spending tends to be larger in countries where public pensions receive little supplement from private schemes. Fourth, in most of the EU10+1, labor force participation rates were extremely high among both men and women pre-transition so almost all elderly have rights to a pension. In Western Europe, by contrast, aside from the Scandinavian countries, women's labor force participation rates are significantly lower than that for men, so that while almost all elderly families have access to a pension, not all individual elderly do. Let us now examine some of these factors in greater detail.
Retirement Age
The EU10+1 countries have relatively low effective retirement ages, although these tend to be rising in recent years ( Figure 4 ). The lower retirement ages suggest that not only is the stock of current retirees high, but future retirees in the EU10+1 will also be younger and eligible to collect pensions for a longer period of time than in the Western European countries (provided life expectancies in East Europe further converge to West European standards). The low retirement ages for women are particularly problematic because-contrary to the situation for males-the life expectancy of women is similar across Europe.
Figure 3. Employment Rate of Older Workers (ages 55-64)
Source: Eurostat; based on LFS. 
Replacement Rates
Meanwhile, replacement rates have been declining in most of the EU10+1 countries, although they remain relatively high in some of them (Table 4) . Many of the EU10+1 countries have taken measures to reduce gradually replacement rates under public pension schemes by strengthening the link between contributions and pensions in the first pillar, including through extending the period of an individual's earnings history that is taken into account when calculating the pension entitlement, limiting noncontributory periods, adjusting the formula used to calculate benefits, and linking indexation more closely to inflation rather than wage developments. Over the recent 10 years, gross replacement rates have risen in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia, while Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary still have replacement rates above the regional average. The trend towards less generous benefit rules has to some extent been countered, at the individual level, by the effects of longer careers (see Figure 5) and higher incomes. Current replacement rates vary significantly across the region. The replacement rate is proportional to four parameters: life expectancy at the retirement age, career length, average income during career and internal rate of return in the PAYG system. 4 As these parameters vary significantly between genders and countries (see Table 5 ), replacement rates also differ substantially. As far as differences between genders are concerned, not only is the life expectancy of women longer at age 60 in all EU10+1 countries (differences Sustainability of Pension Systems in the New EU Member States and Croatia 11
Figure 5. Benefits per Year of Service (Accrual Rates)
Source: staff calculations. In the EU15 countries, calculations are based on a specific benefit formula; for EU8 the benefit formula when available and comparison of average benefit per year of service to average wage when the benefit formula is not available (e.g. Poland and Latvia). 
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Internal rate of return in PAYG depends on productivity and employment growth rates.
vary from 3.7 years in Romania to 5.9 years in Estonia), but also their average career length is in most countries (except Hungary) shorter. Additionally, a significant gap between genders' income further lowers the expected replacement rates of women. The Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and Slovenia face the most urgent choice between lowering their replacement rates and increasing the tax burden to maintain current replacement rates.
Indexation Formulas
Most EU10+1 countries index post-retirement pensions to some combination of inflation and wage growth (Table 6) . Indexation mechanisms are easier to compare across countries than benefits, although rules regarding indexation are changing as well. Indexation is a crucial parameter because it affects not only the newly retired but the entire stock of retirees, which in the case of the EU10+1 countries is both large and young. The feeling in these countries is often that the gain from expected rapid wage growth during the convergence process should be shared with those who did not have the opportunity to participate in the labor market and benefit directly. However, given the large stock of young pensioners, there is a major fiscal cost associated with sharing this gain across generations which undermines the sustainability of the pension systems. Therefore, some countries like Romania or Estonia have implemented pure inflation indexation. Poland, which adopted pure inflation indexation in Note: Ratio of female to male earned income is estimated on the basis of data on the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage, the female and male shares of the economically active population, the total female and male population and GDP per capita (PPP US$). Average exit age from labor force is weighted by the probability of withdrawal from the labor market. 5 . The share of earnings is a result of negotiations between government, entrepreneurs and trade unions. The EU15 countries are facing similar constraints. Germany, which moved from wage-based indexation to inflation indexation on a temporary basis several years ago, in 2005 suspended all adjustment in response to fiscal pressures. Similarly, after toying with wage indexation, Croatia has now returned to a mixed formula.
Contribution Rates
On the revenue side, pension contribution rates in most EU10+1 countries are quite high, especially in Bulgaria and Romania, compared with the EU15 and OECD ( Figure 6 ). The combination of high contribution rates and low replacement rates (as in Bulgaria and Romania) is, of course, even more corrosive. High contribution rates not only discourage formal sector employment, but as wages in the EU10+1 converge toward EU15 levels will put increasing pressure on labor competitiveness. 5 . From January 2008, the government plans to restore annual valorization instead of periodical adjustment on 1 March following the calendar year in which the CPI is at least 105 percent in comparison to the calendar year of the last adjustment. Moreover, indexation is supposed to be based at least in 1/5 on increase of wages in the national economy and in 4/5 on increase of consumer prices.
This problem affects in particular salaried workers. In contrast, the self-employed pay relatively low social security contributions reflecting more favorable contribution bases (Table 7) . On average, the self-employed account for 10 percent of total employment in EU10+1 countries but provide only 6 percent of total social security contributions. This cross-subsidization by the salaried workers to self-employed is unfair, discourages contract employment, and undermines the financial viability of the pension systems (Table 8) .
Implicit Individual Internal Rate of Return 6 (IRR) of the Pension Systems
Expected internal rate of return of the pension system (IRR) is an important parameter for an individual facing a choice between entering the formal labor market or rather looking for
Sustainability of Pension Systems in the New EU Member States and Croatia 15 6 . The internal rate of return is the interest rate corresponding to net present value of a series of payments amounting to zero. The MS Excel calculates it iteratively until the result is accurate within 0.000001 percent. The rate is changed until:
where: d i = the i-th, or last, payment date. d 1 = the first payment date. P i = the i-th, or last, payment. a job in the informal sector. Taking into account the current pension contribution rates and assuming future gross replacement rates as computed by Whitehouse (2007) , we calculated implicit IRRs for a 20-year male worker earning a national average wage during his whole work career and exiting from the labor market at the normal age of retirement 7 . Having this data and using the appropriate earnings measures (mostly a lifetime average) we calculated the pension levels in the first year of retirement. For pensions in the subsequent years, we applied the indexation rules as presented in Table 6 (the other necessary data and assumptions are shown in Table 9 ).
Under this scenario, the IRRs vary strongly across the region, with the lowest and negative value in Romania (−2.33 percent), and the highest one in Hungary (1.15 percent), which is the only positive IRR in the region. However, Hungary offers the highest anticipated replacement rate (75 percent) at a cost or a relatively high contribution rate (26.5 percent 8 ). The IRR turned out negative but close to zero in Estonia, but it is obviously overestimated because the overall pension contribution rate does not include invalidity pension (it is under overall contribution for sickness and maternity). A negative IRR means that the investment of a "representative" individual in the pension system generates a loss, i.e. she/he puts into the system more than she/he gets out of it (taking into account the value of money in time). This result is particularly visible in Romania, as it has one of the highest pension contribution rates in the region, in tandem with one of the lowest replacement rates. 9 The results above indicate that in several countries it makes little sense for an individual to participate in the formal labor market, because the pension insurance either generates losses (the highest in Romania, Croatia and Lithuania) or the expected returns are close to the break-even point (Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria). This hypothesis is confirmed by the positive correlation between pension contribution rates and estimated share of undeclared work in the economy (EC, 2004) and the negative relationship between the individual IRRs and shares of undeclared work in the EU10+1 countries ( Figure 7 and Figure 8) . These facts suggest a quite rational behavior of labor market participants-they refrain from legal employment because it simply does not promise them adequate returns. It also calls for a strengthening the link between pension contribution rates and future replacement rates. 
Financial Solution of PAYG Systems
The combination of these factors has meant that the financial situation of the PAYG systems in the EU10+1 countries has generally not improved in recent years, in some countries related to the shift of part of pension contributions to a second pension pillar (see also below). Most EU10+1 pension insurance systems (the total of the basic old-age insurance fund and the basic invalidity insurance fund) have been in deficit since the mid-1990s. During the period 2000-2004, pension insurance systems were in deficit in every year in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Bulgaria although to varying degrees (Table 10) .
These deficits are due only in part to the introduction of new funded pillars. In Poland, a high and growing deficit in the Social Insurance Fund reflects a combination of factors, operating sometimes in opposite directions, including diversion of contributions to the second pillar since 1999, decline in the number of insured (in 2003, the number of insured was one of the lowest in the last decade), stabilization of the number of people receiving old-age and disability pensions at a high level, and an increase in the gross replacement rate to 56.7 percent in 2004, the highest level since 1998. Moreover, the growing deficit includes a big gap between revenues and expenditures of the pension scheme for farmers, whose pension scheme is strongly financed from general taxes (Table 11) . Similarly, Hungary has been affected by the loss of revenues diverted to the mandatory private pension schemes, but in addition to this by a reduction in overall contribution rates (PAYG plus private) by 4.5 percentage points.
In contrast, in the Baltic countries, pension funds have been in surplus despite the introduction of second pillars reflecting rapid economic growth and buoyant social contribution revenues, better administration and control, and an increase in formal labor market participation. In Estonia, total PAYG reserves amounted to 1.4 percent of GDP at end-2004.
Meanwhile, in countries that did not introduce second pension pillars, the underlying pension finances were different. In the Czech Republic, parametric changes to the basic -balance of the pension insurance system; Estonia-state pension insurance balance (contribution revenue-total pension expenditure); Hungary-balance of social security fund; Lithuania-balance of state social insurance fund; Latvia-state social insurance fund balance); Poland-balance of social insurance fund-FUS (contribution revenue-expenses on financial benefits from SIF) together with balance of social insurance fund for farmers (KRUS); Slovenia-balance of mandatory pension and disability insurance fund (revenue from contribution-mandatory expenditure); Slovakia-balance of pension insurance (total of the balance of basic old-age insurance fund and basic invalidity insurance fund; Bulgaria-balance of social security fund; Romania-balance of pension system; Croatia-balance of the pension insurance system. Source: Social Insurance Agencies.
pension insurance scheme have eliminated the deficit for the time being. 10 In Slovenia and Romania, the smaller deficits or even surpluses have been obtained in more recent years on the back of relatively higher social contribution rates that have aggravated prevailing tax wedges on labor.
Experience with Second Pillar
Mandatory second pillars are only beginning to mature and it is still early to assess whether they will fulfill the hopes that have been placed in them and whether the benefits they bring are commensurate with the transition costs associated with the reforms.
Investment Portfolio
The second pillar pension funds are administered by private asset management companies. In essence, the second pillar is an individual savings scheme, where the size of the final pension depends on total contributions over the career and the rate of return of the pension fund. In 2005, private pension fund assets ranged from 8.7 percent of GDP in Poland to only 0.9 percent of GDP in Latvia. Investment portfolio managers have invested most of the entrusted funds in domestic government bonds and shares of listed companies in accordance with prevailing regulations (Table 12 ). In Poland, these two categories constituted more than 90 percent of the Open Pension Fund assets in mid-2005. The smaller EU10+1 countries have invested a larger share of savings abroad, because the domestic economies do not provide sufficient opportunity for risk diversion (Estonia and Lithuania have allowed foreign investment up to 90 percent and 81 percent, respectively). Typically, countries have initially invested a relatively large share of funds in government bonds, gradually moving to other financial instruments. Because most of the EU10+1 reforms are less than 10 years old, current asset allocations should not be viewed as evidence of either failure or success in achieving capital market development but rather as a milestone of where individual countries currently stand.
Transition Costs
The losses in revenues to the public system are directly proportional to three parameters: the percentage of contributors who joined the new system, the percentage of contributions diverted to the second pillar, and the proportion of GDP represented by the covered wage bill. Thus, Slovakia may have only around half as many switchers (in percent of working age population) as Latvia, but its switching costs per annum are higher because in Slovakia nine percentage points of the wage bill are being diverted to the private pension funds while in Latvia it is only two percentage points (Table 13) .
In practice, it is only in Poland, Hungary and Croatia that the diversion of resources from the PAYG pillar has reached any substantial magnitude (8. 6, 5.2, and 5.6 percent of GDP, respectively). Even in those cases, most of the revenue losses have been financed by the issuance of government securities to the new pension funds, thereby limiting the new drain in the public sector (to 3.2, 1.8 , and 1.5 percent of GDP, respectively for the above countries). Loss of revenues to public PAYG system (state budget) is equal to the ratio of cumulated assets held by pension funds. Net loss to the public PAYG system is equal to ratio of assets held in non-governmental financial instruments (in Table 13 we calculate both measures).
The remaining transition costs have been financed in a number of different ways. In Estonia, the pension system reforms were sufficient to keep the PAYG system in surplus. Slovakia financed its initial transition costs through an increase in the contribution rate by 0.75 percent and through privatization revenues. Privatization revenues were also used to cover some of the transition costs in the case of Poland. Otherwise, transition costs have been financed mainly through borrowing.
Administration Fees
High administration fees in private pension funds have tended to depress the returns to contributors (Table 14) . Most EU10+1 countries have regulated maximum permissible administration fees, and these are generally applied by funds in practice as there has been little real competition so far between funds. 
Returns
The performance of private (second pillar) pension funds in the EU10+1 countries has been mixed so far (Table 15) . In Poland, Bulgaria and Croatia, pension funds have generated relatively high returns, while returns have been disappointing in the Czech Republic and Hungary (an average annual real net rate of return of only 1.1 percent over the period 1996-2004 in the Czech Republic and 1.5 percent in Hungary since the inception of the new system; unweighted averages have been somewhat higher reflecting the fact that larger funds have tended to show a poorer performance).
Sustainability of Pension Systems in the New EU Member States and Croatia 25 b. the rate of return fee in Poland (called premium account fee) depends on relative fund performance and is subject to a maximum of 0.06 percent of assets per annum; c. applicable to members transferring assets to other pension funds before 2 years of membership: 160 or 80 PLN (depending on the membership period); d. the retirement insurance company may charge an additional fee not exceeding BGN 20 for each transfer of the resources accrued on the individual account from one fund to another; e. every insured person will be allowed to join another mandatory fund free of charge after three years of membership of a particular fund have expired, whereas a fee of 0.8 percent determined for switching in the first year; 0.4 percent in the second and 0.2 percent in the third year. Czech Rep. (2003); Estonia: actual fees calculated as market averages in 2004; up-front fee and exit fee are calculated from the net asset value of the unit; management fee is calculated from the total assets of a pension fund; Poland: the up-front fee is scheduled to fall to a maximum of 3.5 Medium-Long Term Sustainability of Pension Schemes W hatever the successes of these early efforts, considerable challenges remain. Looking ahead, the EU10+1 countries will face a significant acceleration of demographic ageing. Three major forces drive the ageing process: increasing life expectancy, low fertility rates, and finally the baby-boom generation reaching retirement age. All these factors, even in countries where the system is currently fiscally balanced, will produce a major financial challenge for pension systems over the coming decades when the number of pensioners will rapidly increase and the size of the working-age population diminish. Although net inward migration may ease the ageing process, the magnitude of potential net inflows of workers in the region is likely to be limited in view of the sensitivities involved.
The population of people age 65 and above is projected to double by 2050 in several EU10+1 countries (Figure 9) . Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and the Czech Republic would all see more or less a doubling of the number of people over the age of 65 by the middle of the century, while old-age population growth would be more modest in Hungary, Romania and the Baltic countries. Sizeable increases in this age group are projected already for 2025: in the case of the first mentioned group of countries, the group would swell by around 60 percent.
As a result, the old-age dependency ratio (number of people aged 65 years and above as a percentage of people aged 15-64 years) would rise strongly in all EU10+1 countries ( Figure 10 ). The old-age dependency ratio is projected to rise by a factor 2-2.5 in the EU10+1 countries, with the largest increases in Bulgaria, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland. The process of population aging (as measured by the dependency ratio) would peak approximately 20 years later in the EU10+1 than in most other EU countries.
Prospective demographic changes and population aging have raised important concerns about the sustainability of public pension systems in the EU10+1 (as in the EU in general). Notes: The second bar for Croatia refers to 2040 and is based on Bank staff projections. Source: Eurostat. 11 11. The Eurostat projections of dependency ratios are based on assumptions concerning fertility, mortality, and net migration. Mortality and migration factor are fixed at "normal" levels, while alternative fertility assumptions are analyzed. We present the baseline scenario for total fertility.
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In analyzing sustainability, it is useful to decompose pension spending (as a share of GDP) into the following four factors (Equation 1 below):
■ A dependency or population-ageing effect, reflecting changes in the ratio of those 65 years and above to working age population (65+/15-64); ■ An employment effect, driven by changes in the ratio of employed to population aged 15-64; ■ An eligibility effect, corresponding to changes in the share of those receiving benefits in the 65+ age group; ■ A benefit effect, related to changes in the average pension benefit relative to GDP per worker.
The last two factors measure the changing "generosity" of the pension system.
Equation 1
Note: Productivity is nominal GDP per employed. Source: based on OECD Economic Survey Spain, 2005. While the results of such a simulation need to be treated with caution (they are very mechanical exercises), they suggest that population ageing and increased dependency ratios are the key factors driving pension spending in the future.
As noted above, countries have not remained inactive towards this challenge. Indeed, many have taken measures that affect the parameters of the equation. Taking these measures into account, the long-term sustainability of public finances in general and public pension systems in particular was analyzed in the 2005 updates of convergence programs for the EU8 countries (Table 17) . 12 These projections confirm that demographic shift will put pressure on public finances by driving up ageing-related expenditure over the coming decades ("current policies" scenarios). However, there are large differences between countries. Estonia, Poland and Latvia are the only EU8 countries where the 
Sustainability of Pension Systems in the New EU Member States and Croatia 29 12. All calculations were made by experts in national administrations and based on a coordinated approach, including the assumption of no change in the pension systems, taking into account last available data and based on latest national or Eurostat demographic assumptions. However, despite a fair degree of consistency across the EU Member States, the projections need to be interpreted with caution as they are not completely comparable across countries because of differences in coverage. share of pension spending in GDP is projected to decline despite rising old-age dependency ratios. Relatively stable pension expenditure levels are projected for Slovakia and Hungary, while a moderate increase is expected for Lithuania. In contrast, pension spending is projected to increase by about 5 percentage points of GDP in Slovenia and the Czech Republic, with spending on pensions in the former country potentially reaching 18 percent of GDP in 2050. The different outcomes for pension spending between our illustrative scenario above (Table 16 ) and these projections reflect alternative assumptions about the other three subcomponents of Equation 1 above. Almost all EU10+1 countries assume increasing employment ratios as a result of assumed higher female participation rates, lower unemployment or planned increases in average retirement ages. These effects all reduce the cost of pension systems, with the effect stronger in countries with currently low participation rates (Hungary and Poland) and/or high unemployment rates (Poland, Lithuania, and Slovakia). The projections above also imply reduced generosity of pension systems in line with recent reforms, although it is not entirely clear from the projections to what extent this reflects the eligibility or the benefit effect.
Nevertheless, the official projections are likely to imply declining replacement rates from the PAYG systems. Assuming, again for illustrative purposes, unchanged eligibility, we can deduct the implied change in average benefits relative to productivity (or replacement rates assuming that wages grow in line with productivity) using Equation 1 above (Table 18) . These calculations for the EU10+1 countries show that substantial, sometimes drastic, declines in replacement rates would be needed in all countries (except Lithuania) if official targets were to be met. The prospects are particularly stark in Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania where replacement rates would need to be cut by half, to very low levels indeed.
These simulations imply that important reforms would be undertaken aimed at reducing benefit rates. Reforms undertaken include shifts in pension indexation from wages toward prices (Estonia and partly Poland), and shifts toward greater linkage between contributions and benefits, including actuarial adjustment for increasing life expectancy. In Hungary, Latvia, and Slovenia-the only EU10+1 countries that provide detailed information on pension projections-lower benefits are projected to save about 2 percent of GDP by 2050.
Lower replacement rates from the PAYG system may be at least partly offset by pension entitlements from the private pension funds, although not in all cases likely to be sufficient to preserve existing replacement rates (Table 19 and Figures 11 and 12 ). This assumes of course that private pension funds generate sufficient returns to contributors. As seen above, the recent experience suggests that this is not yet certain. 
CHAPTER 3
Conclusions R eforms in recent years have improved the efficiency and sustainability of pension systems in all EU10+1 countries, but in many probably not enough to ensure longterm sustainability given prospective population aging. Reforms have included parametric changes to PAYG systems, including increases in retirement ages (not least for women), changing benefit formulas, and changing indexation mechanisms. Some countries (Latvia and Poland) have further strengthened the link between contributions and benefits and sustainability of the PAYG system through the introduction of notional defined contribution accounts. Link between contributions and benefits is also strengthened by moving to point system which many of the countries have done. Several countries have further introduced a second, private pension pillar, funded through diversion of part of the pension contributions to this pillar, thus diversifying risk. However, some countries (in particular, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Romania) will need to do more to safeguard the long-term viability of their pension systems, and others face ongoing and future challenges in ensuring equitable pension systems and adequate living standards for all elderly people.
Further reforms efforts need to be tailored to individual country circumstances, but could include some combination of: 1) Further parametric reforms to PAYG systems, particularly adjustment of retirement ages in line with increases in life expectancy and move toward greater reliance on indexation of pensions to inflation rather than wages. 2) Further strengthening the link between contributions and benefits to change the perception of contributions as taxes in most countries, and minimize the wealth redistribution within the pension system.
3) Consideration of gradual equalizing of retirement age for men and women to avoid discrimination of women on the labor market and ensure a proper level of their future benefits, as their life expectancy in longer. 4) More equal treatment of salaried and self-employed workers. 5) Reduction in special retirement privileges for certain groups of workers (farmers, miners, and so forth) and review of disability pensions. 6) Further labor-market reforms, including tax and benefit systems, aimed at increasing labor force participation and employment, including among older workers and women. 7) General fiscal consolidation and reduction in public debt levels to make room for aging-related spending increases (especially in high-debt countries). 8) Consideration of greater reliance on general taxes (rather than pension contributions) to finance basic pensions in order to support lower labor taxes and employment generation (but caution needed to avoid unaffordable reductions in contribution rates). 9) Encourage greater competition between private pension funds to reduce fees and broaden investment opportunities for these while maintaining adequate prudential regulation.
In considering these options, EU10+1 countries may want to closely study the experience of Latin American countries that have implemented comprehensive pension reforms and the challenges they have faced (including in terms of coverage, fund performance, and governance). Also, lessons may be learned from EU15 countries that finance their pension systems mainly from general taxes (for example, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark) and appear to have been relatively successful in containing pension spending compared to countries that rely on social security contributions (for example, Germany, Italy, France, and Austria).
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